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A B S T R A C T
I theorize that the idea of knowledge and education has shifted in Islam from an inclusive and rational search for
all knowledge to a narrowed focus on religious knowledge, void of rationality. By synthesizing literature on
education and knowledge in Islam, this study identiﬁes three shifts in the cultural history of Islamic education. I
argue that those shifts in what was deemed valuable knowledge have played a signiﬁcant role in the emergence
of radicalization today. The study shows that once the social world of Islam destabilized, the sense of belonging
and sense making became inward and less reﬂexive as compared to that of early Muslims. Belief became pri-
vileged over the rationality mechanisms that had previously formed Islamic endeavors. I demonstrate that a
decline in intellectual and scientiﬁc production followed, allowing extremists to skew Islam’s narrative by
putting forward an idealized version of the Islamic caliphate divorced from rationality.
1. Introduction
The US electoral paroxysm of 2016 has had a consequential impact
on Muslims globally. America’s new and isolationist political narrative
has normalized a negative portrayal of Muslims in the United States and
beyond. In turn, societal Islamophobia has risen sharply: 83% of
Americans are concerned with extremists’ acts of violence conducted in
the name of Islam (Abdo, 2017). Surprisingly, 82% of American Mus-
lims and nearly 90% of American Muslim women share the same con-
cern (Abdo, 2017). Muslims themselves are aware of the societal, po-
litical and cultural repercussions the violence of the fringe militant
Muslims has on the Muslim collective.
The government’s language on Muslims post 9/11 terrorist attack
also impacted Americans’ favorability of Muslims (Smith, 2013). Prior
to the 9/11 tragedy, 80% of Americans were against racial proﬁling,
but following the attack, 60% of Americans favored it, if it targeted
Arabs and Muslims (Cole and Dempsey, 2002). Today, Muslim children
face a challenging environment as their peers in the Western contexts
often characterize Muslims as “stupid”, “poor”, and “very strict”
(Revell, 2010). In 2016 alone, out of 34,676 terrorism deaths, 68 ci-
vilians were killed in the U.S. while the vast majority died in
predominantly Muslim countries: 21,061 were killed in Iraq, Afghani-
stan and Syria (Roser et al., 2018). In the same year, 24.5% of the 1,584
religiously based hate crimes in the U.S. were directed at Muslims
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). These statistics paint a com-
plicated global picture where Muslims hold a dual and bifurcated role
in a larger political and social narrative on extremism: they are si-
multaneously a feared and targeted religious group.
Perceptions of Muslims, as violent and monolithic, have played a
central role in the global discourse on extremism. But, very little work
has been done in the ﬁeld of education to decipher how Islam’s historic
conceptions of knowledge and education may have aﬀected the emer-
gence of radicalization in Islam today. I thus go back in time to trans-
formative moments in Islam’s history when shifts occurred in the
meaning, reception and production of knowledge. By synthesizing lit-
erature on education and knowledge in Islam, this study identiﬁes three
shifts in the cultural history of Islamic education. This study argues that
those shifts in what was deemed valuable knowledge and desirable
education have played a signiﬁcant part in the emergence of radicali-
zation.
I recognize the inherent risk of generalizing when building a para-
digm that helps explain the current fringe and radicalization eﬀorts
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carried out in the name of Islam through moments in Islam’s rich his-
tory when education and knowledge transformed in their role and
meaning in Muslim communities. I also acknowledge that education
and knowledge are not the only or omnipotent forces shaping the tra-
jectory of radicalization in Islam. But, for the purpose of this paper, I
zero in on the carefully selected transitional moments in Islam’s history
and examine how and why Muslim communities, their leaders, educa-
tors and educational institutions have gradually shifted their inter-
pretation of education and knowledge. I theorize the idea of knowledge
and education has moved in Islam from an ambitious, inclusive and
rational search and respect for scientiﬁc and religious knowledge to a
dangerously narrowed focus on primarily religious knowledge void of
any rationality. I connect Islam’s complicated past to the present be-
cause this redeﬁnition of what is to be revered as knowledge has, I
contend, helped create a fertile ground for radicalization amongst those
seeking to legitimize acts of violence through Islam.
2. Transformation of knowledge and education in Islam
I have isolated three key historic shifts in knowledge and education
in Islam. Education here is loosely deﬁned to incorporate all formal and
informal ways of acquiring knowledge. Knowledge is broadly under-
stood as all human produced and revealed, religious knowledge.
Radicalization refers to the interpretation and practice of Islam with the
utmost rigidity and a related intolerance towards alternatives. It re-
pudiates modernity amongst both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. At
times, radicalization turns into violent extremism in the name of Islam,
which is where much of the current academic literature on radicaliza-
tion within social sciences rests. I expand those conversations by re-
framing the role of knowledge and education in radicalization via what
I call a three-stage knowledge transformation theory in Islam.
2.1. First stage from the 7th to 11th century: deﬁning knowledge and
education in Islam
The primary purpose of early religious education in Islam was to
encourage conversion and cultivate a sense of common Muslim identity
amongst learners. According to Prophet Muhammad, each verse in the
Quran represents God’s word revealed to him during more than two
decades starting in 610 CE. Each can be interpreted in seven diﬀerent
ways allowing for diversity of meaning and application (Abbas, 2011).
Islam’s beginning was rooted in diversity of cultural, linguistic and
religious traditions of emerging communities dispersed over a vast and
poorly integrated realm (Bulliet, 1994). During a time of great inequity
and social discord amongst local tribes in the Arabian Peninsula, it
served as an ideological platform that would bring social cohesion and
social justice. The people of the Byzantine and Persian Empires, which
preceded the arrival of the Islamic Caliphate, were exhausted from
continuous wars and found enlightenment in Islam’s acceptance and
encouragement of learning: conversion or becoming part of the Islamic
confederacy occurred across almost all Arabian tribes (Gregorian,
2003). For these reasons, Islam organically expanded and adapted to
local contexts, over time, producing a multifarious global community of
nearly a billion and half Muslims today.
Islamic education in its earliest form was not an institutional or
uniform endeavor. There were limited formal institutions (Bulliet,
1994) throughout the Caliphate’s large territory. Madrasa, Arabic for
“school”, does not even appear in Islamic texts until about the 10th
century (Halm, 1977). During Islam’s early expansion, Quran and the
Prophet’s sayings, hadiths, served as the ideological catalyst behind the
newly converting Muslim communities’ search for knowledge. With a
mainly illiterate population, the oral transfer of knowledge was the
pedagogical tool of that time. Islam’s growth beneﬁted from this nar-
rative informality of early education in turn providing ﬂexibility and
inclusion. Local mentors and teachers brought the knowledge and
practice of Islam into their communities. Traveling through the
expanding Islamic Empire to learn about Islam, young men would re-
turn to their communities to share knowledge (Bulliet, 1994). New
converts learned from Prophet’s early companions, or other learned
men in informal settings or mosques.
Early mosques’ primary purpose was to provide a space for prayer
and worship rather than formal learning. Discussion circles accom-
modated by mosques raised questions and taught various topics to the
curious. Hadiths, Prophet Muhammad’s statements for Muslims with
instructional value to mirror Prophet’s behavior, were widely discussed.
In categorizing over 7,000 hadiths, Bulliet, 1994 determined that the
vast majority of the Prophet’s sayings represented pragmatic knowledge
for the converting Muslims on topics relevant to their daily lives, in-
cluding food, clothing, fasting, health, agriculture and business. Very
few dealt with the broader knowledge on societal issues, such as
criminal behavior or governance (Bulliet, 1994). This reasonably con-
ﬁrms that Muslims’ learning about Islam centered on its ﬂexible inter-
pretation and localized adaptation to guide converts on all matters of
their daily lives.
These early Muslims’ lives and their learning were not exclusively
focused on Islam. To the contrary, even those in search of Islamic
knowledge would eventually re-shift their interests to business and fa-
mily matters while only the most intellectually driven continued to
broaden their religious knowledge or expand their search for knowl-
edge to astronomy, medicine and other sciences (Bulliet, 1994).
Brentjes (2009) concurs that the elites saw scientiﬁc progress as key to
their prestige and, more broadly, societal development. Only about 4%
of the urban elites (Bulliet, 1983) was deeply engaged in religious
studies. Islamic scholars like Al-Jahiz (776–868 CE) argued teachers
should exemplify knowledge and focus on critical thinking in mathe-
matics and writing as the essential pillars to human progress, to which
religious studies were secondary (Günther, 2006). Some, like Ibn-
Sahnun (817–870 CE), favored Quranic memorization and other sub-
jects to be optional. Still, Ibn-Sahnun advocated against a forceful ap-
proach to teaching faith to Christian children, implying that children of
diﬀerent faiths shared classrooms (Günther, 2006).
During this stage in Islam, scientiﬁc and religious forms of knowl-
edge were not mutually exclusive. Instead, Islam’s territorial expansion
was paralleled with the support for scientiﬁc progress. Knowledge is
one of the most frequently occurring terms in Quran, and Prophet
Muhammad was explicit in his instruction to Muslims to search for
knowledge even if that meant traveling to China. This messaging was
interpreted to mean that all knowledge ought to be valued. The respect
for rational inquiry and learning was reﬂected in scholarly and scien-
tiﬁc developments that emerged during that time. For instance,
Baghdad’s House of Wisdom, built by caliph al-Ma’mun (813–833 CE),
had compiled the world’s largest book collection. Urbanization char-
acterized this early period in Islam (Bulliet, 1994), and Baghdad be-
came one of the most vibrant cities by the 10th century with 1,000,000
residents (Chandler, 1987). Meanwhile, London housed about 20,000
residents (Lambert, 2019). In Baghdad, knowledge was preserved and
generated while Europe stagnated through the Dark Ages.
Muslims did not see religious knowledge as in conﬂict with the
scientiﬁc knowledge nor did they see either of the two as uniform. With
the economic prosperity and conquest, instead, the elites valued scho-
larship, ﬁnancially supporting such work. Caliph Al-Ma’mun’s appre-
ciation for sciences was apparent in his peace negotiations with the
Byzantine Empire during which he is thought to have requested the
ancient Greek astronomer, Ptolemy’s book (Angelo, 2008). Building on
Ptolemy’s work, Al-Battani (858–929 CE) expanded our understanding
of our planetary system. Along with his recording of 489 stars, his use of
trigonometry resulted in the corrections of many of Ptolemy’s calcula-
tions apropos Moon and Sun (Chisholm, 1911; O’Connor and
Robertson, 1999). Caliph Al-Ma’mun not only supported scientists, but
funded the ﬁrst known state project, an observatory, and regularly
engaged in debates with other scholars (Welch, 2012).
The House of Wisdom compiled existing knowledge and expanded
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on prior scholarship. Muslim and non-Muslim scholars translated past
works into Arabic so that the new advancements could be made in
mathematics, astronomy, optics, engineering, geography and other
ﬁelds. Muhammad ibn Al-Kwarizmi (780–850 CE) introduced Algebra,
providing the basis for Algebra textbooks throughout Europe until the
16th century (Hitti, 2002; Hill and Awde, 2003). A devout Muslim, yet
Al-Kwarizmi’s work included a Hebrew calendar treatise that detailed
the Sun and Moon’s longitude and other speciﬁcations relevant to
Jewish year (Toomer, 1990). Diversity of knowledge and content
deemed relevant and valuable during this era reﬂected Islamic Cali-
phate’s rational approach and openness to all forms of knowledge and
inquiry. Ibn Al-Haytham (965–1040 CE) was a polymath who advanced
optics and is credited with introducing the Scientiﬁc Method: he argued
that mathematics and experiments ought to be employed to demon-
strate that a fact is indeed a fact (Ackerman, 1991; Smith, 1996). Both
revealed and human produced knowledge was valued, each for its un-
ique but complementary purposes, advancing critical inquiry, ration-
ality and knowledge.
2.2. Second stage from the 12th through 18th century: narrowing knowledge
and education in Islam to its religious and political purpose
The early territorial expansion in Islam was coupled with urbani-
zation where new and old cities grew within the vast Islamic Empire.
People migrated to cities in large numbers, over time, leaving rural
areas without necessary labor to support agriculture: the urban growth
outpaced agricultural productivity gradually ensuing in economic
pressures (Bulliet, 1994). While the inﬁghting within the Islamic Em-
pire characterized much of its history due to its fast expansion across
diverse communities, the gradual economic decline magniﬁed the in-
ternal strife.
With Mongols’ invasion of Baghdad in the 13th century, the Islamic
Empire was in decline. Mongols destroyed Baghdad’s then unequalled
36 public libraries and the House of Wisdom along with killing the
elites and scholars (Murray, 2012). The estimates of those massacred
widely range from 200,000–1,000,000 (Frazier, 2005), and Baghdad
never regained its prior glory. As outside pressures and internal ten-
sions grew, elites wanted conformity of the populous to ensure political
support and stability. To secure power and loyalty, shift towards the
speciﬁc religious and political purpose of knowledge in Islam began. A
12th century Iranian religious scholar, Abd al-Karim al-Sam’ani, wrote
about teacher pedagogy when instructing students on learning and
studying hadiths (Bulliet, 1983). Al-Sam’ani valued oral tradition in
transferring religious knowledge, but, by his time, the informal and oral
tradition was eroding in favor of formal studying in classrooms from a
learned teacher (Bulliet, 1994).
By the 13th century, the learning was more formalized and situated
in madrasas, which were the schools typically attached to and funded by
mosques. Places of scientiﬁc inquiry became marginalized in scope and
focus (Makdisi, 1973). The social prestige steadily detached from sci-
ences and instead aﬃxed to the production of religious knowledge,
triggering the elites to redirect their funding to madrasas, away from
the institutions pursuing scientiﬁc research (Chaney, 2016). As Bulliet,
1994 agrees, this second phase in Islamic religious education was
fundamentally diﬀerent from the early period of oral tradition that was
malleable and adaptable to local context. He concurs religious educa-
tion was situated in formal institutions and reframed through the re-
lationships between students and their teachers. One of the inﬂuential
Islamic education theorists, Al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE), argued that
religious knowledge ought to be above all else and that the teacher was
the ultimate authority: if necessitated, he urged learners to neglect their
friends and family to ensure perfect acquisition of knowledge on Islam
(Günther, 2006).
Education became removed from critically examining the Quran in
lieu of a continued shift towards memorization. Centrality of memor-
ization as a pedagogy minimized critical inquiry that characterized the
initial stage in the development of education in Islam, where Socratic
Method was favored to question assumptions. Some felt that there was
no need to continue to critically examine religious content. “Blind ac-
ceptance” was encouraged (Hilgendorf, 2003). Memorizing of the
Quran was diﬃcult given it averaged over 600 pages along with the fact
that mnemonics were not popular amongst Muslims as a memorization
strategy. Islam was now increasingly utilized to solidify political power
in the region, facilitated by the neglected critical thinking and ex-
panding authority of the religious knowledge.
Challenges to the stability of the Empire along with the shift away
from critical thinking and towards religious knowledge led to a lesser
scientiﬁc advancement. Chaney (2016) for instance analyzed Harvard
University’s collection of all books regionally published from the 12th
through the 18th century and demonstrates a consistent decline in the
publication of science books during this period in Islam. Decline in the
scientiﬁc work is positively correlated with the substantive increase in
the religious books on Islam (Chaney, 2016). Religious leaders gradu-
ally gained political power and expectedly a greater ﬁnancial support
was given to religious education; as a result, this changing dynamic led
to a growing number of scholars opting to study religion rather than
committing their capacities to the scientiﬁc inquiry (Chaney, 2016;
Makdishi 1973; Gibb, 1982).
I further posit that this shift towards religion and neglect of sciences
during the second transformational stage for knowledge and education
in Islam has adversely inﬂuenced the reception of the technological
advances within the Islamic Empire as compared to the European ex-
perience during the same period. Eisenstein (1980) argued that printing
revolutionized access to knowledge in Europe easing the scientiﬁc ex-
change, lowering expense and broadening access to education beyond
the upper classes: the populous could study on their own.
Within the Islamic Empire, printing did not have a comparable
positive eﬀect due to the Islamic Empire’s late adoption of the tech-
nique. The ﬁrst attempt to print the Quran was made in 1538 while by
1500, Europe had already printed “ﬁfteen to twenty million copies of
30,000–35,000 separate publications” (McLuhan, 1962, 207, as cited in
McGugan et al., 2017). It was Alessandro Paganini (1450–1538), a
printer in Venice, who ﬁrst printed the 464-page Quran (Nuovo, 1990,
2013). Given the complexity of the Arabic script, his version of the
Quran had many errors. Arguably, this mishandling of the Quran’s
printing led to Muslims’ adverse reaction further enhancing Islamic
world’s hesitation to print. While Paganini hoped to sell his printed
Quran throughout the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic Caliphate,
which peaked at that time, he instead went bankrupt likely dissuading
others from following in his footsteps.
While one cannot reliably predict what might have happened if the
initial eﬀort to print the Quran was fruitful, it is reasonable to assume
that it would have over time expanded literacy through a broader ac-
cess to the Quran. It would have also been indicative of the Muslims
being more amendable to accept technological innovation in education
during that time. The world’s literacy rate at the onset of the 18th
century was estimated at 12.1%; by the beginning of the 19th century, it
rose to 21.4% (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2018) while for Muslims it
ranged from 2% to 3% (Quataert, 2004). In the 18th century, the Ot-
toman Empire allowed printing of some books, but not the Quran. By
comparison, Jews established their ﬁrst printing press in Hebrew in
1494 (Galanti, 1947, as cited in Birinci, 2019); Armenians did it in 1567
(Gerçek, 1939, as cited in Birinci, 2019); and Greeks followed in 1627
(Moschopoulos 1931, as cited in Birinci, 2019). While the Ottoman
Empire was centuries behind in printing, Christians and Jews were
exempt from the printing ban placed on the Quran and other Islamic
religious texts. When Ottomans allowed printing - due to the books’
lower costs - even the Islamic world witnessed “the expansion of book
ownership” (Hanna, 2007, 189). In other words, a broader access to the
written language and increased literacy could have positively re-
directed Muslim learners away from the primary focus on the memor-
ization of the God’s word and towards a more ﬂexible thinking that
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Muslims espoused during the Golden Age.
2.3. Third stage from the 18th century to today: narrowed knowledge and
education, and its impact on radicalization
This study synthesizes the literature on education, religion and
science in Islam to contour the key three stages during which the ideas
of knowledge and education in Islam took on diﬀerent meanings.
Today, the global Muslim community includes secular Muslims as well
as those solely accepting of an ultraconservative and puritanical in-
terpretation of Islam. Each community contextually interprets the ideas
of knowledge and education as they see it ﬁt. Still some overarching
ideas have emerged throughout history and presently impact a global
radicalization movement in Islam. Even beyond radicalization itself, the
shifts in how Muslims have historically experienced and viewed edu-
cation and knowledge are still impacting education and knowledge in
the Muslim communities. Jointly, Arab nations are minimal consumers
of knowledge produced by other countries with annually only 300
books translated or 20% of what Greece alone translates (Rima et al.,
2002). There are 57 predominantly Muslim countries, with collectively
600 higher education institutions while the U.S. has 10 times that many
universities (Saleem, nd). Of all Christians, 8 out of 10 are literate while
only 6 out of 10 Muslims are (International Islamic News Agency,
2015). The ideas of knowledge and education in Islam have narrowed
over centuries with profound consequences for the economic develop-
ment of the aﬀected population. These circumstances have helped the
fringe radicalization forces successfully target the poor, young and
marginalized.
Western colonialization followed the Ottoman Empire’s decline, and
its eventual disintegration in the early 20th century politically and
economically weakened the largely Muslim regions. Starting with
Napoleon Bonaparte’s ﬁrst invasion of Egypt in late 18th century,
Western powers invaded and began to shape the Muslim world through
the 20th century. They often took rights away from the Muslim citi-
zenry and fostered internal divisions amongst Muslims allowing
Europeans to map out the Muslim world into organizational units that
beneﬁted European imperialist agendas. For instance, when French
invaded Algeria, property and political rights of the native Algerians
were taken away to pave a way for French and European settlers, unless
Muslims abandoned Islam to retain their political rights (Calvet, 2017).
The French building and opening of the geo-strategically important
Suez Canal (Wilson, 1939) in the 19th century eased European colo-
nizers’ access to Asia further sharpening Western interests towards the
Middle East. By 1908, the oil discovery in Iran by a British company,
now an oil and gas multinational BP, increased Europeans’ appetite for
their dominion over the Middle East (Alfred, 2008).
As the World War II ended, the history of the Middle East became
even more complex with the United Nations’ 1947 resolution dividing
Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. At the time, both the US and
its European allies grappled with ways to address the needs of the Jews
who survived the Holocaust (Quandt, 2010). They responded with the
UN proposal, in which: “[t]he Jews were being oﬀered 55 percent of
Palestine when in fact they had owned only seven percent of the
country” (Mattar, as quoted by NPR, 2002). By 1948, the state of Israel
was established and the Arab world was angered prompting Egypt,
Syria, Iraq and Jordan to invade Israel later losing the war against this
newly formed state. As a consequence of losing the war, Benjamin Beit-
Hallahmi (as quoted by NPR, 2002) said, by the end of 1949: "Israel
ended up with 78 percent of Palestine…and [t]he Palestinian commu-
nity in Palestine just disintegrated. The majority of Palestinians became
refugees, and Palestine – the geographical term Palestine – disappeared
from the map."
While the lack of statehood for the Palestinian people remains a
global concern, the Palestinian plight has been eﬀectively leveraged by
the radicalized groups to recruit Muslim youths in the Western context
(Husain, 2009). As Husain (2009, np) notes: “The Palestinian suicide
bombings were considered by all Islamists of all persuasions as legit-
imate, and endorsed by their skewed and unscholarly reading of Islamic
law.” In his work, Husain (2009) refers to a known verse from Quran:
“Whoever kills an innocent person, it is as if he has killed all of
humanity” (Quran 5:32). Other conﬂicts involving Muslims have simi-
larly been employed by the militants to justify the recruitment of youths
and perpetuate terrorism in the name of Islam.
In early 1990s, the global Muslim community watched Bosnian
Muslims ethnically cleansed during the larger political and economic
shifts transpiring with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the
related break up of the former Yugoslavia. The international arms
embargo, adopted by the UN Security Council in 1991 (Ceulemans,
2005), was intended to lessen violence. The West assumed that the
Yugoslav National Army (YNA) would be a neutral player and prevent
violence amongst ethnic groups, but YNA was de facto Serbs’ army
(Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009a, 2009b). As a consequence of the
arms embargo, only Bosnian Muslims remained unarmed. Rather than
being protected by the arms embargo, Muslims became the primary
victims of the horriﬁc violence due to the arms embargo maintaining
the vast imbalance of power between Serbs and Muslims (Sabic-El-
Rayess, 2009). The US eventually intervened in the summer of 1995,
but by then, the narrative of Bosnian Muslims’ suﬀering reverberated
globally inciting Muslim youths to radicalize (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016a;
Alexander et al., 2004; Husain, 2009). In the same manner in which the
lack of Palestinian statehood has been used by the militant groups to
incite hate towards the West and its agenda (Husain, 2009), Bosnia has
provided another reference point that has strengthened Muslim mili-
tants’ recruitment narrative as they approach marginalized Muslim
youths in the West and beyond.
In response to these complex and cumulative economic and political
developments over the last few hundred years, Muslims have typically
resorted to Islam as a unifying or organizing force. Muslims have ﬁrst
resisted the inﬁltration of the colonial powers and later the Western
neocolonial forces and their educational, institutional and cultural
norms because Muslims perceive them as self-serving, corrupt and da-
maging to the Muslim way of life. A reformist Salaﬁ movement, for
instance, initially emerged as the anti-colonial force calling Muslims to
return to a pure version of Islam free of the external inﬂuences and
corruption. It gradually spread through Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco, Indonesia and other Muslim nations from 19th through the
20th century (Campo, 2009). Fueled by oil revenues, Saudi Salaﬁs in
particular have broadened their global inﬂuence and supported the
spread of Salaﬁsm often seeding ultraconservative Salaﬁ ideology in the
crisis prone regions (Sabic-El-Rayess & Mansur, forthcoming in 2020;
Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016a).
Salaﬁsm’s early rejection of the Western imperialism in the Muslim
world during the colonial period has broadened and led into the
emergence of the terrorism and militancy prone Salaﬁ factions in recent
decades. From Al-Qaeda, to Boko Haram and ISIS, militant Salaﬁsm has
evolved with the goal of leading jihad against both Western inﬂuences
and the local, corrupt and authoritarian regimes in the Muslim nations.
Muslims and non-Muslims alike have become targets of these militant
and Salaﬁsm inspired groups resenting the West, but also all forms of
Islam except for their own. In 1970s, the militant Salaﬁs have even
attempted to overthrow what its followers saw as a corrupt and US-
inﬂuenced leadership of the Saudi state (Campo, 2009).
Contextual challenges involving nonorganic formation of nations
that have aligned more with the Western interests than those of Muslim
populations have often coincided with the rise of corrupt and author-
itarian leaders in those local contexts. Broader research has conﬁrmed
how profoundly adverse eﬀects of corruption can lead to both disen-
gagement and demoralization of youths who gradually lose the trust in
the system (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2019, 2016a, 2016b, 2014, 2013, 2012,
2011, 2009; Sabic-El-Rayess et al., 2019; Sabic-El-Rayess & Seeman,
2017; Sabic-El-Rayess & Mansur, 2016; Sabic-El-Rayess &
Otgonlkhagva, 2012). These combined neocolonial and corrupt markers
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undergirding many predominantly Muslim nations today have lessened
both the economic and educational opportunities for Muslim youths.
Muslim youths are increasingly resentful for being excluded from the
political decision making processes in their countries, in turn resulting
in grievances feeding the rise in radicalization and militancy.
The militant groups often see scientiﬁc knowledge and progress as
synonymous with the Western inﬂuences and thus wrongly equate re-
jection of scientiﬁc knowledge with the rejection of the Western poli-
tical, social and economic markers and ambitions. What the radicalized
typically fail to recognize is that knowledge and learning - rather than
violence - is of essence in Islam’s true message as reﬂected in the very
ﬁrst interaction Prophet Muhammad is claimed to have had with angel
Gabriel who instructed Muhammad to “read!” (Al-A’zami, 2003).
While the above discussed colonial eﬀects and contemporary geo-
political dynamics cannot be underestimated as they provide con-
temporary militants with the grievances to leverage in the youth re-
cruitment, our analysis is centered on Muslims’ own conceptions of
knowledge and education, which have transformed through three mega
stages that frame a continued social transformation of education and
knowledge in Islam. This third phase suggests that the conceptions of
knowledge and education within diverse Muslim communities today
are limiting, which has allowed the radicalized groups to grow in their
inﬂuence. The radicalized have rejected the scientiﬁc knowledge and
called for the destruction of what signiﬁes human progress. For in-
stance, during their control over Iraq’s city of Mosul, ISIS ﬁghters nearly
decimated Mosul University, burned its well-known library and closed
its 20 faculties while keeping employed only the medical faculty
members whose services they needed during ﬁghting (Stefan, 2017).
Their call for purity and truth in Islam has been synonymous with their
negation of rational inquiry and innovation in sciences.
Their messaging creates an egregious misconception of what early
Islam stood for and what knowledge was valued. The radicalized in
Islam are able to recruit followers and convince them that not all
knowledge is desirable and only the curated content with religious
underpinnings is acceptable (Sabic-El-Rayess & Mansur, forthcoming in
2020; Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016a). ISIS, for instance, has directed women
to disengage from learning “worthless worldly sciences” in a “Western
lifestyle and sitting in the midst of another culture” (Abdul-Alim, 2015,
np). Instead, women are required to limit their education to the study of
religion at home, living sedentary lives centered around gendered roles
of mothers and wives (Abdul-Alim, 2015). While the extremists call for
a return to the blind adherence to their interpretation of Islam, they
have failed to understand the key point I make in this study: early ex-
pansion of Islam, which groups like ISIS aspire to return to, was ac-
companied not by a rejection or neglect of science but rather by its
broad endorsement and an open call for rational inquiry and search of
knowledge, as inspired by the Quran. If the Muslim world is to progress,
it ought to revive and reclaim its passion for knowledge the early Is-
lamic Empire demonstrated. It is not a rejection but rather search for all
knowledge that produced the Golden Age of Islam.
The ultraconservative groups in Islam today refer to the import of
Muslims’ return to the origins in Islam, but they have reimagined it as
monolithic and rigid. Militant groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) or even those that are non-militant but radicalized have
recruited followers by marketing their return to early Islam as being
conjoined with the rejection of modern knowledge and sciences. For
them, the only acceptable and desirable knowledge is highly curated
religious content that is in conﬂict with the scientiﬁc progress of the
West, which ironically, I show, was founded upon the scientiﬁc ad-
vancements of the early Islamic Caliphate. During early Islam, the
Quran called upon Muslims to search for knowledge about the universe
(Gregorian, 2003). For Muslims, “There was just one science”
(Gregorian, 2003, 28). At the time, the West and China were far behind
the scientiﬁc and technological progress of the Islamic Empire (Huﬀ,
2017; Chaney, 2016). Yet, this espousal of scientiﬁc progress as one of
the drivers of Islamic Caliphate’s growth is not known to those mar-
ginalized and at risk for radicalization today. A recent United Nations
study (Dearden, 2017) on extremism demonstrated that ISIS members
lack even the very basic knowledge of Islam. They see scientiﬁc
knowledge and progress as synonymous with the Western inﬂuences
and thus wrongly equate rejection of scientiﬁc knowledge with the
rejection of the Western political, social and economic markers and
ambitions. They are therefore easily susceptible to the extremists’ da-
maging reframing of the conceptions of knowledge and education in
Islam. These conceptions of education and knowledge are limited to
highly curated religious content and refrainment from a pursuit of the
scientiﬁc advancement, which is in discord with the early Islam’s wel-
coming attitude towards advancing all forms of knowledge.
3. Theoretical framework: fractured belief and rationality
I utilize the discipline of knowledge studies to support my con-
ceptualization of transformation of knowledge practices in Islam. I add
to the theories of rationality (Weber, 1978; Kalberg, 1980; Habermas,
Fig. 1. Fractured Belief & Rationality Framework: Three Stages of Knowledge.
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1984) to create a fractured belief and rationality framework I apply to
the three stages of Islam (Fig. 1). In the ﬁrst stage as Islam expanded
through rapid growth, belief and rationality were harmonious. In the
second stage, when Islam began to faction and the Islamic empire de-
clined, belief began to be privileged over rationality adversely im-
pacting the deﬁnition of knowledge. In the third stage, I see the results
from a complete fracturing of belief away from rationality in the actions
of radicalized Muslims.
Fig. 1
This framework is not recreating the dichotomies already present in
the literature of Islamic pedagogy: that of Islamic education as doc-
trinal, based on memorization and consent to authority or Islamic
education as “ﬂexible” (Waghid, 2011; Meijer, 2009; Asad et al., 2013;
Parvez, 2016). While both typologies of Islamic education have been
evident in Islamic history, the purpose in theoretically framing the
three stages of knowledge transformation in Islam is to show the change
in the governing of knowledge practices at diﬀerent periods of Islam’s
history.
I deﬁne “rationality” and “belief” models in the knowledge dis-
cipline. In knowledge studies, rationality is the theory of reason.
Rationality means to use all valid information or knowledge to pursue
an objective, which is the operating deﬁnition of rationality I employ.
Within the studies on rationality, ideal rationality aims to achieve
“resolutions that are rationally appropriate with (absolutely) every-
thing relevant taken into account—that are optimal pure and simple”
while practicable rationality is “geared to resolutions that are rationally
appropriate with everything relevant taken into account that I can ef-
fectively manage to take account of in the prevailing circum-
stances—that are optimal as best I can manage to tell” (Rescher, 2003,
191). A form of practicable rationality, bounded rationality is a state of
cognition in which one has limited awareness (Simon, 1972). The
limited awareness may stem from “constraints on the information-
processing capacities of the actors” (Simon and Siklóssy, 1972, 162). All
humans experience bounded rationality: power and knowledge reduce
the boundedness but do not erase it. I deﬁne a belief as “justiﬁed. . .
when there is a standing presumption in its favor and no preestablished
(rationally justiﬁed) reason that stands in the way of its acceptance”
(Rescher, 2003, 94). With this essential framework on belief and ra-
tionality, I articulate how the two, initially, worked in harmony to later
experience internal discord ultimately leading to the fracturing of belief
from rationality. Unlike in Islam’s most prosperous days, belief no
longer stimulates deeper engagement with rationality to guide a broad
and inclusive pursuit of the human produced knowledge. As a result,
belief is now more susceptible to being used as the blind acceptance of
deviant narratives about Islam serving the needs of the extremist groups
whose agendas reject rationality as the driver of human learning.
3.1. First stage: rationalizing scientiﬁc knowledge through religious belief in
early Islam
I provide historical support of how rationality and belief were not
perceived as incongruous in the ﬁrst stage of Islam. Belief was not an
eschewing of rationality and being rational did not suggest a lack of
belief. Belief and rationality complemented and worked in tandem with
each other. Scientiﬁc knowledge and discoveries were used to increase
faith and belief in the creator. Such a unity led to the growth of robust
inquiries into all forms of knowledge. Watts states: “It is clear that the
inﬂuence of Islam on Western Christendom is greater than is usually
realized. Not only did Islam share with Western Europe many material
products and technological discoveries; not only did it stimulate Europe
intellectually in the ﬁelds of science and philosophy; but it provoked
Europe into forming a new image of itself” (as cited in Gregorian, 2003,
26–27).
I posit that when Islam began spreading, knowledge was inclusive
and expanding. It was rooted in an ontological “becoming,” in learning
how one should be a Muslim. The Prophet’s hadiths elevated the
pragmatic concerns of Islam rather than the esoteric spaces of knowl-
edge available only to a privileged few. Rationality and curiosity fueled
one’s quest for knowledge. Knowledge was valued as available every-
where in the social and physical existence of the world. The historical
overview suggests that the Golden Age of Islam was propelled by a
curiosity of belonging in the world. There were limited boundaries
between the world of religious studies and the studies of the physics of
the world.
Evidence of knowledge was sought beyond the Quran. This practice
of the early Muslims did not display a contradiction but rather a con-
gruence supported by the Quran (96:1): “Read!” For early Muslims,
“read” meant to understand and learn about the world in its created
magniﬁcence. Early Muslim philosophers and theologians employed
“kalam, a form of dialectic debate and argument” to engage and con-
verse with their Jewish and Christian counterparts (Khalili, 2010). In
this argument, I connect the social development of Islam to the in-
clusive knowledge apparatus practiced by early Muslims. Based on our
synthesis of historical evidence, early Muslims did not see a contra-
diction in the pursuit of rationality as scientiﬁc knowledge and sense-
making, and the pursuit of their beliefs.
In this stage, the intertwining of belief and rationality is perhaps
most evident in the following hadith, “Trust in God but tie your camel”
(Jāmiʻ at-Tirmidhī 2517). What should one do: leave a camel untied or
tied while trusting in God? Prophet Muhammad stated it was necessary
to believe and do the rational by taking into account the laws of the
world. The hadith guided early Muslims into how they should act with
both belief and rationality. They were dissuaded from believing in
miraculous interventions that may not be aligned with rational actions.
Early Islamic practices did not disavow, but rather accepted the logical
sequence of an action. Belief required rationality. Today, ISIS members
who believe that a suicide bombing would secure a place in heaven
have reimagined belief falsely with no ties to rational behavior.
Early Muslim philosophers such as the Mu’tazilites promoted ‘ra-
tional theology’ and suggested that reason should be used to “assess the
claims of revelation” (O’Hear, 1982, 13). Mu’tazilites, of the rationalist
school of Islamic theology (8th-10th century), valued rational means to
judge good and evil. For the Mu’tazilites, “good and evil are rational
categories which can be established through unaided reason” (Fakhry,
1983, 47). Contemporary jihadists use “Mu’tazilite” as a derogatory
term for their rival groups to reduce their credibility and show disdain
for a rational basis of religion, demonstrating the fracturing of belief
and rationality.
I underline the importance of rationality, especially in context of
knowledge in religions. In Abrahamic religions, including Islam, fol-
lowers have faith or belief in an omniscient power. Yet, these belief
systems are contextualized through human rationality and the social
eﬀects of doing ‘good’ versus ‘bad’. Consequently, belief is framed in
religion as undergirded by rationality. Those who have undergone the
fracturing of belief and rationality reduce belief to its baseless rigid
form, devoid of rationality. These radical agents may seek to justify
their awry beliefs as truth through irrational means. Radicals may be
cognitively driven by “presumptively justiﬁed beliefs” (Rescher, 2003,
86), unchallenged by their rational underpinnings. Militant jihad
prompts many radicals to become suicide bombers. Radicals reinterpret
their truth of belief in jihad, irrationally ending lives. They fail to un-
derstand that ending one’s own and others’ lives is considered a grave
sin in all Abrahamic religions. Such discrepancies demonstrate the es-
sence of the completion in fracturing of belief and rationality.
3.2. Second stage: privileging religious knowledge & divorcing rationality in
Islam
As Islam began to faction, the process of divorcing rationality from
belief began. The dominion of rationalist schools dwindled and inter-
pretation of revelation was given a higher place over rational thinking
(Ashraf, 1985, 27–32), due to the inﬂuence of Al-Ghazali on Muslim
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thought. The inﬂuence in the broader discourse of Islamic education
(Halstead, 2004) has provoked the deep cleavage between the multi-
faceted rich philosophy of early Islam and the narrow notions of
knowledge that lead to radicalization and extremism. Chaney (2016)
demonstrates this transformation with the mushrooming of madrasas,
ﬁrst in the east followed by their expansion to the west of the Islamic
Caliphate (Lapidus, 2014). The rise of madrasas paralleled the scientiﬁc
production’s decline; 12% of the knowledge produced in the Islamic
Caliphate were science books, dropping to 3% by 1200s (Chaney,
2016). As madrasas spread through the west of the caliphate, the sci-
entiﬁc book production declined. Instead, there was growing focus on
derivations (Chaney, 2016) of the earlier works rather than original
inquiry seeded in the rational probing and expansion of knowledge.
As the social world of Islam rapidly destabilized, knowledge was
redeﬁned as a more exclusive endeavor, something that could be valued
and gained only by insiders. Memorization, in madrasas regulated
knowledge. A societal shift towards belief occurred. This shift crowned
the traditionalists’ victory over rationalists where “the traditionalists
reli[ed] on faith and shun[ed] reason (Makdisi 1962, 38, as cited in
Chaney, 2016, 6–7). Traditionalists feared the rationalists’ displace-
ment of the religious intermediaries in the matters of faith as ration-
alists in Islam consistently encouraged direct relationship with God
(Crone, 2006) and saw belief as a stimulant for the rational scientiﬁc
inquiry.
Rote learning and memorization but not rational inquiry became
key forms of gaining knowledge. The sense of belonging and sense
making in the world became inward and less reﬂexive as compared to
that of early Muslims. Belief as truth was privileged over the rationality
mechanisms that had previously formed Islamic endeavors. A sig-
niﬁcant decline in intellectual and scientiﬁc production within the
Muslim world followed.
3.3. Third stage: fractured belief and rationality in contemporary Islam
In the current stage of a “comparative intellectual stagnation in the
Muslim world” (Bugaje, 1996, 58), belief has begun to be understood as
the sole purveyor of privileged knowledge without taking into account
the rationale underlying the beliefs. I underscore that “belief” as a
knowledge practice is based on an interpretive schema and can be da-
maging without its rationalistic basis. Radicals such as ISIS members
fail to know the basis of Islamic practices. Islamic scholars note these
are based on rationality rather than imagined privileged ways of being
that uphold certain beliefs. The radicalized attempt to restore Islam’s
failures to its past glory actually by recreating and perpetuating failures
through fundamentalist Islamic movements (Hoodbhoy, 1991).
This type of restorationist response suggests that there is a pure
idealized Islam of the past to which all Muslims should adhere to re-
create Islam’s glory. Salaﬁsm, a rigid and restorationist interpretation of
Islam that ﬁrst emerged in the 18th century and has since propelled
some radicalized groups into militancy during the 20th and 21st cen-
tury, champions this goals (Sabic-El-Rayess & Mansur, forthcoming in
2020; Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016a). No such past existed. Islam began with a
rationalist approach that was not insular. The historic evidence shows
that not only is there no such idealized past, but any attribution of the
Islam’s early prominence to its claimed rigidity and blind acceptance of
belief, as is currently marketed by the radicalized groups, is ﬂawed.
The extremists’ goal to resurrect the imagined glory of Islam
through jihad, the militant application of their belief resentful of ra-
tionality, has instead ungloriﬁed Islam and solidiﬁed its negative per-
ception globally. In the U.S., Muslims are presently viewed less favor-
ably than 7 other key religious groups - Jews, Catholics, Protestants,
Hindus, Mormons, Buddhists and evangelical Christians - while more
than half of the population in the U.S., Russia and Western Europe see
Muslims as “fanatical” (Lipka, 2017).
Rapid radicalization is correlated with this shrinking space of what
knowledge means, how it is gained and the ontological connections to
knowledge. Hoodbhoy, 1991 noted that the contentions on whether
science was Islamic have pervaded many Islamic countries including
powerful actors like Saudi Arabia. Commenting on Hoodbhoy's work,
Edward Said stated “scientiﬁc rationalism at a time of social crisis and
questioning within the world of Islam…” is a great need (n.d.). A way of
being in the world as based on belief is disconnected to the ways of
gaining rational knowledge. Gaining rational knowledge is not seen as a
way to further belief.
The eﬀects of “preserving Islam” from “corrupt secular inﬂuences”
has paralleled the rise of radicalization (Hoodbhoy, 1991, 1). I note
here two diverse trends in the Muslim world: one depicting high trends
of illiteracy and lack of education (International Islamic News Agency,
2015), and the other displaying educated Muslims, even women, to
gravitate mostly to the STEM ﬁelds (Weingarten, 2017). Yet, a fractured
belief and rationality framework is applied not to the level or type of
education but to the epistemological stance on the relation between
Islam, belief, rationality and knowledge practices. For instance,
Gambetta and Hertog (2009) ﬁnd that a disproportionately high
number of college educated extremists are engineers likely due to their
preexisting rigid “mindset” with which they entered their training.
Extremist groups have aimed to ‘preserve’ Islam from corrupt secular
inﬂuence through diﬀerent means, including withholding education for
girls and blasting suicide bombs with destructive use of engineering.
The lack of dialogue between the rational spheres and the belief as
truth spheres is hinged on the perception that they are incompatible.
When a “rational approach to human problems is considered alien to
Islamic culture,” radicalization and extremism arise (Hoodbhoy, 1991,
1). For those who are radicalized, the fracturing is complete between
the two spheres. In our framework, the complete fracturing leads actors
to irrational solutions. The complete fracturing has implications for
individual actors and for Islamic society generally. A radicalized
Muslim may simplify even complex phenomena such as economic crises
to being caused by “the lack of belief” (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016a; Sabic-
El-Rayess & Mansur, forthcoming in 2020).
The disassociation between belief and rationality aﬀects all aspects
of actors’ lives. Their relationships deteriorate as they withdraw from
Muslims and non-Muslims. They may ignore obligations to family who
had not undergone the fracturing process. Actors imagine a community
whose boundaries are marked by belief oriented knowledge practices.
These communities are grounded in reestablishing an imagined Islamic
splendor of morality and actions. The continued rise of Salaﬁsm de-
monstrates one such community that has suﬀered the fracturing of
belief and rationality. Within these imagined communities, only a lit-
eral interpretation of the Quran is permissible because it associates the
actor with the ﬁrst generation of Muslims who are presumed to be
exemplary and moral. ISIS morality police was known to sanction be-
haviors according to their imagined morality framework (Almohammad
and Spechard, 2017).
The empirical evidence (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016a; Sabic-El-Rayess &
Mansur, forthcoming in 2020) of practices among the radicalized shows
that they put their trust in belief based knowledge practices. The ra-
dicalized imagine their truth of Islam to be gained in communities such
as ISIS and amongst radicals who act on their extremist beliefs. The
fracturing explains the challenges that are seen with radicalization
today. A conﬂict laden geographical state supported by laws and gov-
ernance for which there is no rational basis create a space for their
sense of belonging. Their followers do not challenge or inquire but
mindlessly follow trite imposed beliefs of the recruiters including vio-
lence, human traﬃcking, reduced status of females in illegal marriages,
and widespread murder - none of which could rationally and justiﬁably
be derived from Islam’s original intent.
4. Discussion and implications
The implication of our fractured belief and rationality framework is
evident in markedly diﬀerent contexts. When there is cohesion in a
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system, organization, country or empire between rational thinking and
values that create beliefs, it leads to growth and inclusion. In such
contexts, democratic principles govern knowledge and education
practices. In the ﬁrst stage of Islam, the social and political governing
bodies of the Islamic Empire challenged the ideas of 7th century Arabia
from which Islam had sprung. Racism was challenged. Female in-
fanticide was stopped as the Quran banned it (Qur’an 17:31 and 81:
8–9, Oxford World's Classics edition). When European women had few
rights, women gained the legal authority in Islam to own and inherit
property and consent to marriage (Esposito, 2005; Lewis, 2002). Of the
total number of books produced between 8th and 11th century, about
10% generated new scientiﬁc knowledge (Chaney, 2016).
The second stage of Islamic history shows that the Islamic Empire
neglected science sacriﬁcing future progress. It began the process of
introversion which furthered decline of social progress and political
structures. Leaders and elites lessened their support for scientists’ work
in the framework of rationality. This transformative distancing from
rationality as the basis for inquiry was not linear or immediate.
Complex societal change never is. Rationality continued to play a role,
but to a notably lesser extent. Scientiﬁc knowledge production was on a
decline: the number of the scientiﬁc books in the Islamic world plum-
meted by about half in the 12th century and again halved by the 17th
century (Chaney, 2016). While pockets of scientiﬁc production con-
tinued to operate during this stage, they gradually lessened and many
dissipated. This disregard for sciences as the driver of progress and
modernity solidiﬁed at the time when Europe pursued its own scientiﬁc
revival. Europe began to leverage knowledge generated during the Is-
lamic Golden Age. While earlier centuries in Islamic thought were
marked by the extraordinary hunger for the creation and building of
new knowledge, this second stage was marked by bounded derivations
(Chaney, 2016) of earlier works.
I draw a parallel here to the current US political tactics of creating
boundaries and walls and turning inward from geopolitical partnerships
when its power is challenged in its current formulation. Politics of
white nationalism’s solidiﬁcation occurs at the expense of internal
dissent and divisions. Similar to the discussed divorce of the restora-
tionist forces in Islam from rationality in order to return Islam to its
idealized glory via blind belief, exclusion and violence, current events
in the U.S. are also a demonstration of my framework of the fracturing
of belief and rationality. Growing white nationalism that idealizes the
imagined past void of ethnic, racial and religious diversity is pushing
the country’s leading political narrative to reﬂexively reject rationality
and reimagine its strength in the rejection of a more inclusive, open and
diverse country. Yet, the United States has undeniably become a mul-
tiracial and multiethnic country, complicating the white nationalists’
aspiration of fracturing the American unity. The inward looking
mindset revived by the white nationalists has been helped by the rigid
interpretation of the Christian belief similarly void of rationality. Such
calls to return to the rigidity of Christian belief are reminiscent of the
1933 call by a German pastor who spelled out strict yet irrational
guidelines for German Christians: “We are conscious of Christian duty
toward and love for the helpless, but we also demand that the people be
protected from those who are inept and inferior” (Hossenfelder 1933, as
cited in Camacho, 2018, np).
My framework shows how tensions seeded in the prominence of
belief void of rationality and contextual adaptability produce exclusion
and narrowing of vision rather than growth through exploration and
inclusion. Challenged by the combined factors of external and internal
problems, the Islamic Empire turned away from inclusive rationality in
Islam. To unify its people under threat, the Islamic Empire sacriﬁced
future progress in science, and eventually met decline. The stagnation
of progress led to greater tension, characterized by limitation and in-
troversion, giving rise to radicalization within Islam.
5. Conclusion
Islam is not incompatible with science. I also do not support a view
of Islamic society as monolithic and backward. I have shown a novel
connection between stagnation of knowledge practices in Islam and the
current rise of radicalization. Extremists skew Islam’s narrative by
putting forward an idealized version of the Islamic caliphate divorced
from rationality. The Muslim world should now consider restoring the
Islam’s original coupling between belief and rationality.
I have also shown broader relevance of the fractured belief and
rationality framework to other contemporary settings at risk, an agenda
that is beyond the parameters of this paper. I hope others will use what I
have presented in this study to further explore the danger of the United
States and other nations falling into the traps of the fractured belief and
rationality framework. For Muslim communities, a new transforma-
tional stage in Islam would provide the space and opportunity to restore
the fractured relationship between their belief and rationality. I hope
that such restructuring would reignite the intellectual growth and sci-
entiﬁc revival in the Muslim world. This transformational shift would
mitigate what has been lost to the centuries long neglect of the rational
scientiﬁc inquiry.
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